The Mecca Pact’s Expansion and a New Test for Diplomacy

Ambassador (Ret.) Ersin Erçin

The deadly Houthi air attack on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh has confronted the Mecca Pact with a test that can scarcely be deferred. Saudi Arabia is seeking tangible assurances from its partners, while in Türkiye, the agreement’s parliamentary approval process has yet to begin. Iran’s offer to facilitate dialogue with the Houthis, meanwhile, has added a diplomatic dimension to the search for military solidarity.

In these circumstances, Egypt’s possible accession to the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement would mean considerably more than bringing the armed forces of four countries under a common framework. Cairo could add the northern gateway to the Red Sea, the economic weight of the Suez Canal and one of the principal centres of Arab diplomacy to the partnership established by Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The agreement’s strategic focus could thus extend beyond the defence of the Gulf to the security connections linking the Eastern Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.

Yet Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty’s remarks to the media on 13 October did not constitute a decision to join. A strong declaration of support for Riyadh and the “serious consideration” of membership represent distinct political thresholds. Preserving that distinction is essential to understanding both Cairo’s intentions and the limits of the emerging partnership.

The Shock in Riyadh and Ankara’s Timetable

Escalating Houthi missile and drone attacks reached a new threshold on 10 October, when a strike on Riyadh’s airport killed 13 people and injured more than 300. A further attack on the same airport the following day claimed another life, underscoring that the threat was far from an isolated incident.

For Riyadh, the repercussions extend beyond the loss of life. Repeated attacks on the capital’s international gateway undermine confidence in the state’s ability to provide protection and damage Saudi Arabia’s ambition to become a major centre for investment, tourism and aviation. The inability of senior executives from several leading energy companies to attend the energy congress in Riyadh offered a tangible illustration of how the security crisis is affecting economic diplomacy. Against this backdrop, the Saudi leadership’s expectations of support from its partners have become increasingly urgent.

Türkiye’s timetable needs to be understood within this context, while keeping the sequence of events clear. The agreement had been expected to be submitted to the Turkish Grand National Assembly the previous week, but that did not happen. On 12 October, President Erdoğan announced that it would be sent to parliament in the coming days. Although no causal link has been established between the delay in the parliamentary process and the 10 October attack, a political connection remains a plausible interpretation.

As the attacks intensify, Riyadh’s demand for immediate solidarity grows more pressing. At the same time, they make it increasingly apparent in Ankara that the commitment under consideration concerns an ongoing conflict, rather than a hypothetical future contingency. The same developments could therefore generate pressure to accelerate approval while prompting closer scrutiny of the scope and terms of any military contribution. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s emphasis on 8 October that Türkiye would not participate in offensive operations suggests that this distinction was already central to Ankara’s thinking before the deadly weekend attacks.

These circumstances may also shape Cairo’s calculations. Saudi Arabia’s growing security vulnerability increases the potential value of an Egyptian contribution. Yet the continuing deliberations in Türkiye suggest that the relationship between membership commitments and operational military responsibilities has not been fully clarified. For Cairo, the strategic appeal of joining may be growing alongside the need to define its terms carefully.

Why Cairo Was Not Among the Original Signatories

Following his meeting with Hakan Fidan in El Alamein in August, Foreign Minister Abdelatty had already stated that Egypt was examining the agreement seriously, drawing attention to its constitutional, legal and technical implications. Cairo’s renewed expression of interest should therefore not be interpreted as an abrupt reversal over an agreement it had rejected two months earlier. It is better understood as an option kept open from the outset, now gaining renewed prominence amid a worsening crisis.

The publicly available, verifiable explanation for Egypt’s absence from the initial signing was that its assessment remained under way. Reports in August suggesting that Saudi Arabia had opposed Egyptian participation should not be treated as established diplomatic fact. Without a detailed account of the negotiations explaining the original trilateral format, attributing a veto or reluctance to any one party would oversimplify the issue.

There are, nevertheless, understandable strategic reasons for Egyptian caution. Cairo must reconcile solidarity with Riyadh with its own priorities when determining the responsibilities it is prepared to assume in other countries’ crises. Given its direct interests in Gaza, Sudan, Libya and the Nile Basin, the scope of any new defence commitment is hardly a secondary consideration. From Egypt’s perspective, the partnership raises questions not only about what it would contribute to Saudi security, but also about how far its own concerns would be accommodated.

Yemen’s place in Egypt’s strategic memory should not be overlooked. The exceptionally heavy human and economic costs of President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s decision to intervene militarily in North Yemen in October 1962, driven by his pan-Arab ambitions, help explain Cairo’s caution towards an open-ended ground war there. Supporting Riyadh and becoming embroiled in Yemen’s internal struggle for power remain distinct choices for Egypt.

The Cost of Waiting

What may have changed over the past two months is less the rationale for caution than the cost of waiting. Persistent insecurity in the Red Sea is not merely a distant war’s indirect consequence for Egypt. It directly affects Suez Canal revenues, foreign currency inflows and the country’s aspirations as a logistics hub. Abdelatty’s references to losses in canal traffic in his recent statements underline this connection.

Egypt’s calculations cannot, therefore, be reduced to solidarity with Riyadh. As commercial shipping increasingly shifts towards alternative routes, Cairo may feel more acutely the economic cost of waiting for others to restore security. The safety of Egyptians living in Saudi Arabia and the depth of the two countries’ economic ties add further weight to these considerations. In this respect, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry’s recent emphasis on both the stability of maritime routes and the welfare of Egyptian nationals in the Kingdom is significant.

Another possible consideration is the cost of remaining outside the decision-making process. Egypt is directly affected by developments in the Red Sea and is unlikely to be comfortable with a regional security agenda shaped principally by three other capitals. Membership could offer more than access to support: it could provide a voice in preparing decisions, defining the limits of missions and discussing the arrangements that might follow the conflict. Although Cairo has not publicly presented this as a condition, it is a compelling strategic inference from Egypt’s position.

The Agreement’s Geography and Internal Balance

Egypt’s most distinctive contribution to the Mecca Agreement would be its geography before its troop numbers. The Suez Canal, its Red Sea ports and its naval forces could offer the partnership new capabilities in protecting maritime transport and providing logistical support. There is scope for practical complementarity between Türkiye’s industrial and technological capacity, Saudi Arabia’s financial resources, Pakistan’s military experience and Egypt’s geographical position.

Control of Suez, however, does not amount to control of Bab el-Mandeb. The capabilities of four separate armed forces will not become an effective joint capability without a shared, up-to-date picture of maritime activity and threats, alongside arrangements for intelligence sharing, resupply, communications and rules of engagement.

Politically, Cairo could strengthen the partnership’s standing in the Arab world. Its accession should not, however, be expected to bring automatic endorsement from every Arab state. Coordination with the United Arab Emirates, particularly over local partners in Yemen and maritime security, will remain important regardless of how many countries join.

Expansion could also have mixed consequences for the pact’s internal workings. Greater capacity may come with more complex decision-making. A new balance would have to be struck between Cairo’s expectation of an equal voice, Riyadh’s need for immediate support and the differing priorities of Ankara and Islamabad. Egypt would naturally seek to participate as a partner helping to shape the rules, rather than simply as a provider of military assets.

A New Division of Responsibilities for Riyadh and Islamabad

For Saudi Arabia, Egyptian membership would bring the institutional backing of an important Arab partner capable of sharing the political burden of the conflict in Yemen. Maritime surveillance, logistics, training and mutually agreed defensive tasks could help Riyadh deploy its resources more effectively. Cairo’s diplomatic weight could also ease any sense of isolation.

Egypt’s involvement would not, however, promise a decisive military outcome against the Houthis. Suppressing a dispersed missile and drone capability and establishing a sustainable political order in Yemen are different challenges. Additional support could strengthen Riyadh’s negotiating position, but it could also raise the costs of the conflict if it encouraged expectations of a swift military resolution. To the extent that the Houthis regarded Egypt as an active belligerent, they might also seek to extend their threats to Egyptian-linked shipping or assets. Much would depend on the nature of Egypt’s role, rather than membership alone.

For Pakistan, a fourth partner could help distribute the contributions expected in the Gulf. Egyptian responsibilities in maritime security and logistics might make it easier for Islamabad to balance support for Saudi Arabia with the demands of its own security environment. Yet Egypt’s accession would not imply that Cairo would adopt Pakistan’s position in every South Asian dispute. As the partnership expands, the question of which risks are genuinely shared will become increasingly consequential.

Türkiye’s Principal Opportunity

For Ankara, the most significant opportunity arising from Egyptian accession would be the prospect of turning normalisation with Cairo into regular security consultation. Joint planning and sustained contact could reduce the need for the two countries to interpret each other’s intentions through indirect channels during crises. Differences stretching from Libya to the Eastern Mediterranean would remain, but a framework could emerge in which they were addressed earlier and more directly.

The value of such a development should not be measured by Egypt’s distance from third countries. Türkiye’s more durable gain could lie in becoming an indispensable interlocutor in Cairo’s security calculations. Joint training, maritime security cooperation and defence industry projects could give practical substance to that relationship. Their implementation would, of course, require further political agreement, resources and technical compatibility.

At the same time, Egyptian participation could share Türkiye’s responsibilities within the pact while reducing its ability to shape the agenda on its own. Ankara’s success would lie less in drawing Cairo towards every Turkish preference than in producing shared outcomes despite continuing differences.

Tehran’s Mediation Initiative

Iran’s involvement broadens Riyadh’s options, while also bringing questions of trust to the fore. Following a conversation with his Saudi counterpart on 11 October, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced Tehran’s readiness to facilitate dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The Iranian Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson reiterated the offer the next day. The proposal, effectively an offer to facilitate talks with the Houthis, has yet to become an accepted mediation process, let alone a ceasefire.

Through such an initiative, Tehran may be seeking both to prevent the conflict from generating a broader alignment against Iran and to demonstrate that it cannot be excluded from efforts to reach a regional settlement. An offer to mediate from an actor that supports the Houthis creates an evident tension that Riyadh may view with suspicion. Yet intermediaries with diplomatic influence are not always neutral. The practical test will be whether Iran’s contacts can help halt attacks and produce commitments that can be implemented.

It would also be misleading to assume that Iran’s influence over the Houthis gives it unilateral control over all of the movement’s decisions.

Egypt’s possible accession could create an additional opening. If Cairo can offer reassurance to Riyadh while maintaining contact with Tehran, it could strengthen the partnership’s diplomatic capacity. Together with Ankara and Islamabad, it might help translate the confidence generated by defensive support into momentum for a ceasefire. The seriousness of the offer would need to be tested against observable outcomes, including fewer attacks and greater protection for civilian air traffic and commercial navigation. Coordination with existing UN and Omani channels could prove more productive than competing mediation initiatives.

Implications for Iran and Israel

From Iran’s perspective, Egyptian accession would increase the prospect of broader political and military coordination confronting it in the Red Sea. Tehran’s assessment would depend on whether the arrangement remained focused on protecting Saudi territory and commercial passage, or evolved into a wider security framework directed against Iran. The latter could deepen perceptions of encirclement.

Israel’s calculations would be more complex. Curtailing the Houthis’ capacity to attack could serve Israeli interests. Conversely, more regular security coordination among Türkiye, Egypt and Saudi Arabia could affect Israel’s regional freedom of action and its diplomatic calculations over Gaza. Since Egypt could join the partnership while retaining its peace treaty and existing security relationships, it would be premature to describe the emerging arrangement as an anti-Israel military front. For Israel, the decisive issue would be whether the four capitals could act together in specific crises.

Sensitivities in Athens and the Greek Cypriot Administration

For Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration, the principal concern would be a deepening security relationship between Egypt and Türkiye. Cairo is an important partner for both in energy, maritime delimitation and diplomatic coordination in the Eastern Mediterranean, as reflected in their trilateral summit declarations.

Possible accession to the Mecca Agreement would not, however, automatically alter Egypt’s existing maritime delimitation agreements. Nor would it necessarily bring Cairo’s position on Cyprus closer to Ankara’s. The initial response in Athens and the Greek Cypriot administration might be to seek assurances that existing relationships would be preserved and to anchor cooperation in further concrete projects.

Ankara’s gain would lie in making it harder to take Egyptian support for arrangements excluding Türkiye for granted. This offers a more realistic measure of the potential shift than claims that the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean has been transformed entirely.

The Major Powers’ Calculations

The United States could welcome Egyptian participation as a contribution to greater regional responsibility for security. The extent of Washington’s support would nevertheless depend on the pact’s compatibility with American security relationships, the technologies involved and its implications for Israel. The arrangement could offer opportunities for the United States while also requiring close attention to its direction. At this stage, describing it as either wholly anti-American or an American-designed project would be speculative.

Russia might regard greater independence among regional actors as consistent with its vision of a more multipolar order. It might be less enthusiastic, however, about the possibility of a stronger Turkish regional role coinciding with a weaker Iranian position. Moscow’s approach could be shaped less by a preference for a single bloc than by its desire to preserve relationships across several capitals and retain influence over developments.

China’s priority would be the stability of energy supplies and trade flows. If Egyptian accession made the Suez–Red Sea route more predictable, Beijing would benefit. If it accelerated a wider confrontation with Iran, China would approach the same development with caution. From Beijing’s perspective, the partnership’s value would depend less on rhetoric about whom it opposed than on its ability to keep trade routes open and reduce tensions.

These assessments do not reflect declared official reactions to an accession that has yet to take place. They point instead to possible tendencies inferred from the interests of the principal actors.

Egyptian membership could turn the Mecca Agreement into a stronger partnership capable of addressing the security needs of a wider part of the region. That would require recognising not only Cairo’s military capabilities, but also its concerns and its right to help shape decisions. Such an expansion would acquire lasting significance if it moved beyond meeting Riyadh’s immediate need for support and produced a shared political approach to restoring stability in the Red Sea.

The question that will shape the Mecca Agreement’s future is not simply how many capitals sign it, but the political and military purposes to which they choose to direct their combined regional power.